Dhruba Hari Adhikary
At the start of January 2021, India is taking its seat in the UN Security Council for a two-year term. Nepal cast its vote for India when election for the same was held in mid-June. Kathmandu did not allow the vexed Kalapani issue to be a stumbling block. As on some other occasions in recent past, Delhi probably has ‘noted’ this latest contribution Nepal made during this UN vote in which 192 members participated. This will be the eighth time for India to assume this responsibility; but discerning observers are aware that it hasn’t always been easy for Nepal to endorse India’s candidacy.
Once India happened to compete with Japan – the country which had a long tradition of selflessly helping Nepal for its economic upliftment. Nepal was placed on an unenviable position, but eventually decided to support the next-door neighbour. Tokyo was obviously disappointed, and made its displeasure known through Nepal’s newly-appointed ambassador in 1990s. Ambassador Kedar Bhakta Mathema’s memoire tells it all.
Achievement
Anyhow, the latest successful bid that India made at the UN has been claimed as a ‘major diplomatic victory.’ And it is not an exaggeration. To secure a seat in the 15-member Security Council, which is often described as the most powerful body in the UN system, during these challenging times is indeed a notable achievement. While a non-permanent member does not have a veto power like the permanent ones, numbering five (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA), India together with other nine members is entitled to take part in all substantive discussions on matters pertaining to international security and stability.
Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic is taking its toll on the world order. It is sure to have profound consequences on the structure as well as performance of all international institutions, including the UN. Measures aimed at adjustments are unavoidable. A changed context is also likely to persuade both Asian giants, India and China, to tone down their current belligerent posture during the Council sittings, and find solutions to more pressing global issues. At Council meetings, they would be keenly watched by rest of the UN members, and anxiously wait to see their resolve to settle longstanding border disputes in an amicable manner.
Superficially, both China and India have a choice to seek mediation by a third party. And we have seen leaders like Donald Trump are willing to jump into the fray. However, such a trajectory is unlikely to produce any lasting solution. On the contrary, it can open doors for outside interference. And non-Asians might not be able to write right prescriptions for Asian ailments!
The 21st century is also dubbed as the Asian Century. Top leaders from both China and India are certainly conscious of this, and also about each other’s requirements. They have been doing businesses amounting to tens of billions of dollars. In early 2019, Indian media reports showed steady augmentation in Chinese investments, reaching US$ 4.6 billion. Surprisingly, the thorny border problem did not prevent implementing projects beneficial to either side.
Alongside, high level border talks have been regularly held in Beijing and Delhi alternately. The summit level parleys between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping initiated in Wuhan, in April 2018, were followed up in October 2019 at Chennai.
President Xi visited Nepal on his way back home.
Logically, Chinese and Indian leaders can resume their stalled dialogues on their own. If need be, there is an active regional body in SAARC that can facilitate meetings and deliberations between India, a SAARC member, and China, a SAARC observer. Nepal houses the SAARC secretariat in Kathmandu. As a non-aligned country, Nepal believes in resolving disputes through peaceful means. Conflicts like the one in1962 are bound to inflict colossal loss of lives and infrastructures on both China and India, with devastating effects on the entire Himalayan region.
China is a stark reality. Its economic might and military strength are felt by the rest of the world, including India as has been made clear in the preceding paragraphs. What is wrong if Nepal conducted similar transactions with China – one of its two immediate neighbours? As is known to all, Nepal’s requisites are distinctly smaller when compared with India’s.
Still, Delhi has a tendency to create obstruction of one kind or the other whenever Nepal makes a deal with China. As we have seen in recent months, Delhi cried hoarse when Kathmandu said India’s unilateral action of constructing a road in the Kalapani area was not acceptable to Nepal. But Indian army chief went to the extent of saying that Nepal was objecting to the construction at someone else’s behest, alluding to China. That was simply preposterous.
In late 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi’s India raised hell when Nepal purchased some defence equipment from China. Delhi’s argument was that the 1950 treaty required Nepal to consult India before making such purchases from other countries. This is not true. What Article V of the Peace and Friendship Treaty says reads as follows: “The Government of Nepal shall be free to import from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal.”
Clearly, this treaty provision requires “consultation” only if the imports are to be made “through the territory of India.” In that particular case, supplies were being transported by road directly from China, via Arniko highway. Since the Article I of the same treaty acknowledges and respects the “complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other”, there was no point for Delhi to be hawkish, and then spread canards – through its tamed media outlets – that Nepal was breaching treaty obligations.
Bhattarai’s astute reply
Shailendra Kumar Upadhyay, foreign minister at that time (1986-1990), has included detailed references to this episode in his memoire published in 1991. His book contains relevant facts about the events leading to trade and transit blockade that India imposed on Nepal, and subsequent people’s movement that brought about political changes in April 1990. Incidentally, the Chinese arms issue was raised again when interim prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai was on a visit to India a month later. Some ‘selected’ reporters asked what they expected to be inconvenient questions to the Nepali visitor. But Bhattarai’s responses visibly disappointed the initiators, because he stood steadfast in his reply: “Well, every government needs arms. I went through the files. I came to know that they had asked from India also. But the price that India had quoted was five times higher than what the Chinese had given.” These four sentences say it all.
Lesson: It is high time to give up the paranoid thinking that anything and everything associated with China is either worthless or dangerous, or possibly both.
(Adhikary is a journalist active since 1978 and writes on regional issues. dhrubahari@gmail.com)
– The Rising Nepal
